What Kenya should aim for in Somalia?

In formal terms, international law is contained in bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements between states, international conventions and international treaties. It is embodied in regional and international bodies such as the African Union, the East African Community, the Community of Eastern and Southern African States, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the United Nations, the International Court of Justice or the International Criminal Court. 

However, from a political perspective, international law has a whiff of victor's law, as where the United States (and other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council) determine what is in their best interest is also in the best interests of the global community, dictating what is right and what is not. The United Nations Charter specifically outlaws 'regime change' and yet, when it was expedient, the United States has effected regime change in Iraq, Afghanistan and, more recently, Libya. As it is, no one is going to suggest that George W Bush or Barack Obama be arraigned before the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity or war crime for the command decisions they have taken in prosecuting their various wars around the world. Indeed, where George Bush was tentative in his use of remote-controlled, pilotless aircraft and special forces soldiers in his pursuit of 'terrorists', Barack Obama has not only carried on from where his predecessor left off, but has also expanded the use of these tools to wage an unrelenting global war against the enemies of the United States in places as diverse as Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen and in our own backyard, Somalia. In the words of a fictional TV character, all wars are crimes.

Kenya has decided to join in on the war gravy train, sending troops to bring the war to the doorsteps of al Shabaab after years of provocation. Someone should have a quiet word with those suggesting that Kenya may have violated the spirit of the UN Charter and other international agreements and remind them that regardless of the legality of the campaign being waged in Somalia, Kenya was and is right to do as it s doing. 

Ahmednasir Abdullahi, in today's Sunday Nation's Straight Talk suggests that Kenya may have broken international law in its war with al Shabaab; the government's reasons for engaging with al Shabaab, according to Mr Abdullahi, do not hold water and that this can be cured by the expedient withdrawal of troops from the battlefield (Legal pitfalls in pursuing al Shabaab across border). If the war is wrong in conception, the length of its prosecution is immaterial; it remains illegal regardless of the time spent on the battlefield, whether or not the objectives of the war are achieved. 

For two decades, Kenya has watched as the international community bungled the Somalia Question; it has spent time, money and manpower to bring the fractious clans to a round table and hammer out an agreement that would bring peace to that benighted land. All of its efforts have been for nothing and Somalia continues to be the Sick Man of the Horn of Africa. It is time that the warmongers among the Somalis were reminded that even apparently docile countries like Kenya have a breaking point and ours was arrived at a long time ago. So, regardless of Mr Ahmednasir's sage advice, Kenya should ignore the international rule-book and stay in Somalia for as long as it takes to persuade al Shabaab that waging their brand of liberation militarism should be confined to their side of the border; crossing over shall have serious consequences, as no doubt the Kenya Defence Forces are reinforcing even today.

It is Donald B Kipkorir, writing in Standard on Sunday's Shores Beyond! who takes the biscuit (Let us fight hard in Somalia but be clear on when to declare victory). Mr Kipkorir suggests that Kenya should aim for three alternative outcomes before declaring victory: the installation of a pliable government in Mogadishu; the sub-division of Somalia between Kenya and Ethiopia; or the creation of a buffer zone between Kenya and the government in Somalia by the creation of an autonomous state within Somalia that owes its allegiance to Kenya and not Mogadishu, to be headquartered at Kismayu. The first and last options are fantasies that will only be realised when hell freezes over. The second option can only be achieved if Kenya gives up the foolish notion that they can create a client state within Somalia that will do its bidding with regards to the security of Kenya. 

A buffer zone along Kenya's 1,200-mile long border with Somalia can be created by making it extremely expensive for al Shabaab and like-minded groups to operate there. This can be achieved by ensuring that the traditional command and control structures of al Shabaab in this buffer zone are demolished, and every time they are re-established, they are destroyed once more. Kenya, therefore, must be prepared to constantly violate Somalia's sovereignty every time it has intelligence that al Shabaab is re-emerging in the buffer zone. Kenya cannot afford a long occupation of Somalia; nor can it pay for the maintenance of loyalty of an autonomous region within Somalia. Our public finances are stretched thin and it would be the foolhardy president who decides to expend national treasure in a project that will not succeed. Until such time the West takes its head out of the sand and agrees on a realistic agenda for the Somalia Question, this is the only practicable solution to the al Shabaab problem today.

Our strategic interests in Somalia in the medium term are security related. Now that Kenya has gotten off the fence, it is time that it re-oriented its policy towards Somalia. Once its military campaign against al Shabaab is concluded, it should join the African Union Mission in Somalia, AMISOM, in bolstering the strength of the Transional Federal Government, the TFG, with the objective that the TFG will be expanded to accommodate all moderate voices in Somalia. Once the TFG is capable of holding and securing the whole country, Kenya can consider withdrawing its troops from AMISOM. This is the only reasonable strategic objective that can be pursued with any hope of success.