The army and civilian works

An army (from Latin arma "arms, weapons" via Old French armée, "armed" (feminine)) is a fighting force that fights primarily on land. ~ Wikipedia

Armies are usually characterised by their discipline, enforced through their hierarchies and the troops' obedience of the chain of command. Their distinct nature usually attracts them to the performance of non-core functions, such as when they are called out during national disasters such as earthquakes or floods. The manner in which they carry out civilian operations during periods of emergency usually commend them to politicians for use in other civilian roles, such as road construction and the like.

These, it must be remembered, are not the core roles of the army. The core role of the army is as a fighting force. The reason for the discipline and organisation of an army is to fight. The civilian works they engage in are temporary, meant to ensure that the skills the army possesses do not atrophy and can be applied in real-world situations without actually having to go to war. Thus, it is fit and proper to employ the army sometimes in times of civil emergency, but not all of the time.

In Kenya, because of the corrupted and atrophied civilian institutions, there are those who suggest that the army should be incorporated fully in civilian matters. That would be a mistake. The army is disciplined and has received accolades when it has participated in UN peace-keeping missions or assisted the civilian leadership during natural disasters. But when it has participated, or indeed become the principal institution, in policing, the army has not been well received. It has been hated for that.

The history of the army in policing operations has been abysmal. The Shifta War, the Wagalla Massacre, the West Pokot pacification and the Mt Elgon anti-SLDF operation come to mind; the army was accused of human rights violations that have never ever been resolved. Therefore, there must be a balance between when the army should be called out to perform civilian functions and when it should not, the balance being tipped towards the latter.

As a fighting force, the army should be able to operate under all conditions. Natural disasters give the army an opportunity to put its training to practical use. Therefore, by all means let the army repair roads and bridges after a landslide or a flood; but do not turn the army into a road-builder or constructor of bridges because it will do so without disobeying the civilian leadership. That might blunt the army's fighting preparedness, and blunt it discipline. Especially in Kenya where infrastructure projects are riddled with corruption, engaging the army as the principle contractor could corrupt its institutions and make it worthless as a fighting force.

The solution to infrastructure development is not more army discipline but better designs of the projects themselves to reduce waste, delay, corruption and cost. Since the construction of the largely useless Turkwell Gorge Dam, major civilian infrastructure projects have gotten bigger and more corrupt, making billionaires where none existed because of the corruption. JM Kariuki's retort about ten millionaires and ten million poor people has become true in ways that he couldn't predict, largely because of the corruption in public infrastructure problems. This is not the cesspool to drop the army into.

Army chiefs Kianga and Tonje espoused the best qualities of the army; I hope that General Mwathethe will restore the army's reputation that has somewhat been tarnished under General Karangi's tenure. The image of soldiers engaged in corrupt acts should be erased. Keeping it out of general road construction or bridge-building will be a very good first step. Whether this will happen depends on how strong-willed General Mwathethe will be in the face of political demands from men and women who have never served in uniform.