If the Kenya Defence Forces operationalises the Nairobi Metropolitan Command, it will have joined all other well-organised militaries the world over in having a specialised command for the nation's capital. However, risks abound if the new unit is tasked with ordinary policing duties, even if these involve the interdiction and prevention of terrorist acts such as the one that occurred at the Westgate Mall in late September, 2013.
The involvement of the Kenya Defence Forces' special forces in the Westgate siege was a mistake. The army is a strategic weapon, to be deployed only when there are larger strategic issues at play. Police units, on the other hand, handle the short-term, tactical events that raise the hackles of all law-abiding citizens. the decisions to deploy the KDF to Westgate, to allow them to take over the managemet of the situation, and to allow them to employ heavy weapons was a strategic blunder that taught al Shabaab plotters more than the Somalia incursion ever will. In the field of battle, commanders must choose the right weapon for the right terrain; make the wrong choice and you face the possibility of defeat.
In the realm of terrorism, it is intelligence that wins contests. Intelligence gives the security establishment either advance notice of an attack or it provides real-time information about the perpetrators of an attack. This is not a role that military forces are suited to play, save in the context of military operations in war theatres. The fusing of strategic or tactical intelligence with policing is the one-two punch the security establishment must thrown to take down actual or potential terrorist threats. If the Nairobi Metropolitan Command is intended to perform an anti-terrorism function as this blogger has illustrated it, then it will be a wasted opportunity to bring Kenyan military preparedness into the twenty-first century.
The Nairobi Metropolitan Command, of course, should be able to participate fully, and robustly, in internal security matters if they escalate beyond the capacity of the policing authorities. The only question that remains is how to define the level of escalation that will require the intervention of elements such as the KDF special forces. The threshold must be placed high; otherwise the risks that the civil society industry is prematurely wailing about might just come to pass.
The Nairobi Metropolitan Command should ideally, separate the day-to-day administration of the Kenya Defence Forces from the strategic and operational elements of the military. The removal of the operational military element from DoD headquarters is the first step. It is high time that the Nairobi Metropolis got its own command which should oversee the preparedness of the KDF to operate in this mostly urban terrain should it ever be necessary. Of necessity will be the need to fashion a reporting mechanism between the ranking officers in the KDF and the National Police Service and National Intelligence Service when conducting joint operations in the Nairobi Metropolis. The "friendly fire" incidents of the Westgate siege should be banished to the ash-heap of history.
Finally, the national security Council needs to professionalise the management of national security and public safety. It is not enough to create new commands for the military while major problems in the policing infratructure continue to receive barely a nod from the national command structure. Vetting of senior police officers seems like a bright idea; an in-depth assessment of the exercise identifies more public safety and national security risks that we are willing to admit. There is little we can do to reverse the process. We can only anticipate the challenges identified with the vetting and address them as they arise. A crucial intervention is that the national security establishment get off their back-sides and put the whole machinery of government on a war footing to react properly to public safety challenges and to address national security threats with precision. This blogger trusts that the proper lessons have been learnt from Westgate; if they have not, our collective asses are toast!
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