The collapse of Uhuru Kenyatta's KANU was inevitable. Since his defeat by Mwai Kibaki and his allies in the 2002 general elections, Mr Kenyatta has been marking time in KANU, distracted by his rivalry with Raila Odinga, the Prime Minister, and hell-bent in re-kindling the love Central Kenya had for his father in the 1960s and '70s. Against the wishes of President Moi, Mr Kenyatta refused to stand again for the presidency in 2007, instead choosing to support Mwai Kibaki's re-election. It was then that the seeds of his departure from KANU were planted.
While he may dislike the rebellious nature of the approach taken by the party Vice-Chairman, Gideon Moi, and the party's Secretary-General, Nick Salat, in attempting to clarify his place in the party, Mr Kenyatta must admit that contrary to accepted leadership norms, he has treated his party very shabbily. His membership in the Gang of Seven is a clear signal that he does not consider the Independence Party to be a significant player on the national political stage. For a party that ruled the country for four decades, this is a humiliating climb-down. It seems that with Mr Kenyatta's departure, the party will no longer be the political colossus it once was.
Mr Kenyatta now has barely a year to not only join a new political party but to consolidate his leadership of that party, recruit its members and prepare it for the general elections scheduled for March 4, 2013. The current narrative is that Mr Kenyatta has been persuaded by his outings with the members of the G7 that he is popular on a national scale and that regardless of what political vehicle he rides in, his march to State House will be unimpeded. Mr Kenyatta risks political irrelevance if his plans do not come to fruition exactly as he hopes. He faces several challenges, however.
2007, again, was not just catastrophic for the former ruling party, its aftermath now seems destined to dim his political star. In 2008 and 2009, both Martha Karua and Mutula Kilonzo attempted to forestall what they saw as a political risk for the Deputy Prime Minister when they attempted in vain to persuade him and his allies that an amendment to Kenya's former Constitution was a safer option in dealing with the violence of the 2007 general elections. Mr Kenyatta and his advisors must have thought that given that the International Criminal Court had yet to convict anyone for international crimes that the same would be true with regards to the Kenya situation. After all, Mr Kenyatta was not only a senior member of the Cabinet but his allies controlled the key ministries that would be involved in any engagement with the ICC. George Saitoti was firmly in charge of the Internal Security Ministry, Mutula Kilonzo controlled Justice, Moses Wetangula oversaw foreign affairs, and Kalonzo Musyoka was the V-P while Amos Wako tamely followed his master's lead.
When the ICC Prosecutor announced that he would give Kenya more time to put its house in order, Gitobu Imanyara took the initiative and attempted what Martha Karua and Mutula Kilonzo had failed to achieve, perhaps thinking that his GEMA ties would assuage whatever suspicions Mr Kenyatta may have had of the two Justice ministers' intentions with a local tribunal. The failure to establish a local mechanism to try the suspects of the post-election violence should have been a warning for the Deputy Prime Minister. Instead, his animus for Mr Odinga clouded his reasoning and today he finds himself not only indicted for the violence that took place in 2007 and 2008 by the international court, but facing the prospect of a protracted trial in the middle of his presidential campaign and, should he manage to win the presidency, during the first years of his first term. Mr Kenyatta has treated the ICC situation as a political game every step of the way, one that he intends to win, and every time he has chosen to make the wrong choices and take the wrong steps.
Now with his decision to abandon the former ruling party Mr Kenyatta places himself in greater peril than ever before. His legitimacy as a Deputy Prime Minister is derived partly as a consequence of his leadership in KANU. He must not delude himself that he is free to act as William Ruto does; the deputy leader's position in ODM is not similar in any way to the Chairmanship of the party. The power that the party chairman enjoys in KANU is enormous and to risk it simply to cock a snook at the Prime Minister is the height of folly. Mr Kenyatta exposes himself to a much more serious legal challenge than the one Nick Salat launched against him in the Mombasa High Court. In that case, the High Court may have been persuaded that this was a transitional period and that it was not proper for serving members of the Cabinet to resign their positions in their parties. It would have been an imperfect argument but one the Court would have been willing to listen to in light of current events. Indeed, given that nearly all political parties faced the same legal situation, the Court may have been persuaded that the situation would be resolved after the next general elections. With his abandonment of KANU, Mr Kenyatta exposes himself to a wholly new risk.
Unlike Mr Odinga who still enjoys popular support among the rank and file of his party, Mr Kenyatta cannot boast of the same advantage. A significant proportion of the membership of his party, which has been reduced to pockets of support in Central Kenya and Rift Valley, is hostile to his interests. If he declares publicly that his sympathies, and political future, lies in another party, this may be all that Nick Salat and Gideon Moi need to push him out of KANU once and for all and thereby set the stage for his departure from the Cabinet entirely. He may not even enjoy the president's support if he wishes to remain as Deputy Prime Minister. That, in turn, would strip him of the remaining vestiges of official state support in his tribulations with the ICC which in turn would make it easy for the ICC Prosecutor to execute a warrant of arrest against him.
As it is, some of his key allies are in the wrong place at the wrong time. Amb Francis Muthaura is out of the Cabinet Office and his replacement, Francis Kimemia, may not have Amb Muthaura's skills in managing the ICC situation as may be demanded. Robinson Njeru Githae, his replacement as Finance Minister, has his hands full with the 2012/2013 budget and may not be able to properly defend his interests in the Cabinet if things get dicey. Moses Wetangula has been replaced by Prof Sam Ongeri at the Foreign ministry and he may not be the best person to manage the diplomatic side of getting Mr Kenyatta off the ICC's radar with the 2013 general elections looming. Even Prof Githu Muigai, Amos Wako's replacement, may be unable to do much to protect the DPM when the chips are down. While the Director of Public Prosecutions has long ties to the KANU establishment they pre-date Mr Kenyatta's entry into politics. Keriako Tobiko, the DPP, owes his public service life to President Moi and he may not feel any loyalty to Mr Kenyatta should he be called to assist him going forward.
In treating with the likes of William Ruto, Eugene Wamalwa and Kalonzo Musyoka, and abandoning KANU, Mr Kenyatta is making what the Americans would call a Hail Mary pass. Whether he is successful depends entirely on what his adversaries do. If Mr Kenyatta thinks that Raila Odinga, Martha Karua, Peter Kenneth, Moses Wetangula, Eugene Wamalwa will treat him as a potent force once he loses his KANU chairmanship, someone is misadvising him mightily and, perhaps, leading him to ever greater peril. Whether Mr Kenyatta can see the folly of his decision, only time will tell. He will either win it all or spend the rest of his life wishing that he had thought first, and fast, before he leapt.
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