Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) are in Somalia as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). After the spectacular collapse of al Shabab fighting forces in and around of the port of Kismayo, KDF/AMISOM became the new sheriffs in town. Kismayo was the preferred port or the export of the one commodity that was almost as valuable as bullets and fighters: charcoal. It is now rumoured - maliciously perhaps - that KDF has done what Kenyan security officers tend to do: it has entered into the lucrative business of exporting charcoal to the gulf.
The rationale behind the KDF deployment in Somalia was to prevent further attacks, especially in the border areas between Kenya and Somalia, by al Shabaab. With the prevention of al Shabaab attacks, KDF would then target their sources of funding, which despite the breathless repetition about piracy, was charcoal. Finally, KDF would deny al Shabaab territory to operate in as Kenya attempted to build a buffer zone between al Shabaab territory and the border. One of the promised outcomes was that many al Shabaab fighters would attempt to reintegrate, while the hard core members would increasingly find their theatres of operation shrinking and their options reducing. There would be one or two signature attacks in Kenya, but these would peter out as it became clearer that al Shabaab had lost power, territory and legitimacy and, with it, the will to fight.
Instead what we have today is a complex problem that has highlighted key flaws in Operation: Linda Nchi. If it had just been a short-term military operation meant to punish al Shabaab without engaging with them for a prolonged period, we would not be having a debate about whether KDF should continue to be deployed in Somalia. Operation: Linda Nchi or whatever it is called now is in its third year. Attacks along the border with Somalia have reduced considerably. Attacks in Kenya have gone up considerably. The problem is no longer a military operation against a militia, but a policing and intelligence war against a well-armed and determined fifth column in Kenya. In the former, KDF were triumphant. In the latter, the National Police and the National Intelligence Services have been abject failures.
It is not unreasonable to demand the return of KDF from Somalia now. Their job there is done. If the powers-that-be wish to keep them on deployment, they can do that along the border to reinforce the National Police Service's border patrols. The war has shifted to the homeland and the broadsword of the KDF is useless among the civilian population. What we need now is a scalpel in the form of better intelligence co-ordination and better policing tactics. On the intelligence front, unless someone has a dossier on the inner workings of the NIS, we will give intelligence officers the benefit of the doubt especially as they do not have the misused powers of their predecessors in the Special Branch.
Policing, on the other hand, is in complete shambles. Despite the assurance of the President, Deputy President, Interior Cabinet Secretary, Interior Principal Secretary and the Inspector-General and his spokespeople, it is now an immutable fact that confidence in the police is at an all-time low. It's tactics are derided by every professional in the security business. It's failures are highlighted at every turn and its statistics on improvements on policing are treated with disdain. The obsession of the policing infrastructure with political problems of the Jubilee administration and not the safety of the people means that n regardless of what we are told, we will continue to avoid any direct interaction with the forces of law and order. If the sub rosa war against al Shabaab is to be won on the homeland, it is time that we all admitted that current policing tactics have failed. That is the most important step going forward.
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