We are not an army of charcoal-sellers.

It takes a lot out of a man to admit that they are not brave; that in fact, they are cowards who would run from the face of danger and never look back. This blogger will not admit to being a coward, save to say that unless fat stacks of green backs are involved, he will not involve himself in the quarrels of others. Kenya, like the People's Republic of Chine, did everything in its power to avoid involving itself in the quarrels of others. But beginning in 1994/95, it became a major contributor to the UN's blue-helmeted "peace-keeping" forces. Then it started mediating disputes; the results have been mixed thus far.

 

It's greatest achievements, in the fond memories of Gen Lazaro Sumbeiywo, Kalonzo Musyoka and Bethuel Kiplagat, must surely be the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the government of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and the creation of the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia. The Sudan peace deal held even in the face of provocations between the two nascent governments; the peace, in South Sudan however, has unraveled and in its wake has left behind thousands of bodies and smouldering SUVs (bought in the excitement of the peace deal.)

 

Kenyans are, however, paying for the failure of the Somalia TFG in standing up on its own without propping up from the AMISOM. The Somalia government has failed to keep the Shabaab contained; the Shabaab has become Kenya's greatest security nightmare since the days of the militia murders in 2004 to 2007. We involved ourselves in the quarrels amongst the peoples of Somalia because their quarrel was leading to bloodshed and mayhem on our side of the border; if they had kept their murdering on their side of the border we would have continued doing what we had always done: receive refugees and take money from the UNHCR to keep them reasonably safe and fed.

 

So we sent Special Forces, the Navy and the Army to Somalia. we conquered territory that had been in the hands of the Shabaab. Our soldiers were brave and professional. Some of their comrades were felled by Shabaab bullets, but we consoled ourselves that it was a price worth paying if it meant the Shabaab problem went away. The problem did not go away. The bombings, kidnappings and shootings did not stop. The Shabaab is as much a nightmare today as it was four years ago. Regardless of what our original mission in Somalia was, it is no longer a viable strategy to use the broad sword of an army to control the metasticising cancer of a terrorist organization. It is time for a new strategy and having Kenya Defence Personnel engaged in the business of exporting charcoal to the Arab Gulf out of the Port of Kismayu is not what we'd call a viable strategy.

 

We can carry on as before and leave KDF in the diminishing returns status of the AMISOM mission. Or we can change tack and adapt just as the Shabaab has. It is time to target the Shabaab in a broad swathe. It should no longer just about denying them ground to operate in Somalia or in the badlands of North Eastern Kenya; it is time to target their communications and intelligence lines, as well as their financing. It is time to smash the network it has built for itself in order to act with impunity in Kenya. And the lunacy of Usalama Watch is definitely not a strategy likely to lead to success. Unless we are willing to behave exactly in the fashion that Israel behaves with its Palestinian Problem, we have no choice but to find a more intelligent way out of the box we find ourselves in.